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July 6, 2009 1 Introduction
Modern explanations for urban agglomeration hinge on departures from “perfect” mar-
kets, in the Arrow-Debreu sense, as fundamental reasons why ﬁrms and households cluster
together. Economies of scale in production are conducive to agglomeration, but result in
departures from perfect markets in the form of monopolistic or monopolistically compet-
itive industries. Risk pooling in dense markets may also be conducive to agglomeration
when agents are risk averse when it is recognized that markets for risk are incomplete, an-
other type of market imperfection. In this paper, we explore the transmission and pooling
of risks in a model of an urban agglomeration characterized by imperfect competition due
to economies of scale and by workers’ risk aversion. Industries within this agglomeration,
which export products to the rest of the economy, face stochastic demands for their prod-
ucts, producing output and income shocks that aﬀect the local economy. We investigate
the simultaneous determination of industrial structure, employment relationships, and
earnings risk, under varying assumptions about risk aversion and the ability of ﬁrms (or
workers) to access ﬁnancial markets within which risks can be traded.
Our analysis is motivated by three stylized facts. First, an emerging literature presents
evidence on the existence and the nature of labor market pooling. In a early study,
Diamond and Simon (1990) have shown that workers are willing to accept lower wages
in locations where many ﬁrms locate. More recently, Ellison et al. (2008) oﬀer evidence
about the existence of important labor market pooling eﬀects as industries hiring the
same type of workers are also more likely to locate near one another. Overman and Puga
(2009) highlight in a very precise way the eﬀect of uncertainty on labor market pooling by
showing that ﬁrms belonging to a same industry and having larger idiosyncratic shocks are
more concentrated. Large concentrations of ﬁrms therefore smooth ﬁrms’ idiosyncratic
shocks and improve their ability to adapt in good and bad times. Second, the empirical
literature presents compelling evidence of the relationship between agglomeration and
Chamberlinian input sharing. For instance, Holmes (1999) ﬁnd that ﬁrms are more likely
1to fragment their production and use external inputs (i.e. to disintegrate or outsource
production) if they locate close to ﬁrms in the same industry. This positive relationship
between vertical disintegration and industrial concentration is highly suggestive of the
existence of input sharing eﬀects. Similar empirical results are summarized in Rosenthal
and Strange (2004). Finally, the empirical literature oﬀers evidence that labor contracts
partially shield workers against changes in business and industry risk. For instance,
Baker et al. (1994) ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ wage policy absorbs most of the shocks arising
from idiosyncratic business ﬂuctuations. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) demonstrate the
eﬀect of implicit contracts on wage stability. In many empirical studies, the wage is
shown to ﬂuctuate less within the ﬁrm than in labor spot markets (e.g. McDonald and
Worswick, 1999, for Canada; Devereux and Hart, 2007, for the U.K.). Such stylized facts
motivate further investigation of the relationships between business risk, fragmentation,
labor markets and labor contracts, which is the objective of the present paper.
This paper discusses a model where outsourcing stems from the fragmentation of ﬁrms
endowed with a production structure ` a la Ethier (1982), where uncertainty arises from
uncertain prices on external markets or from uncertain productivity, in the spirit of Krug-
man (1991), Duranton and Puga (2004) and Wildasin (1995) and where ﬁrms may be able
to insure workers using implicit labor contracts as in Baily (1974), Azariadis (1975) and
Rosen (1985). More speciﬁcally, as in Ethier (1982), we assume a set of ﬁrms in an urban
area or economic region operate under conditions of increasing returns to scale. These
ﬁrms – henceforth called “manufacturing ﬁrms”, for convenience – produce tradeable
goods, using non-traded intermediate goods and services called “components”. These
intermediate commodities may be produced within the manufacturing ﬁrms themselves –
a vertically-integrated industrial structure. Alternatively, components may be produced
by specialized component producers who sell these components to the downstream man-
ufacturing ﬁrms. In this “outsourcing” case, manufacturers beneﬁt from input sharing
and “Chamberlinian externalities”, that is, from the larger diversity of components that
2are produced in a region hosting more component producers (see further discussion in
Duranton and Puga, 2000; Fujita and Thisse, 2002, chapter 4). Stochastic demand for
traded goods implies that manufacturing outputs, prices, and proﬁts are also random, as
are derived demands for intermediate and primary inputs. In particular, external demand
shocks may result in stochastic ﬂuctuations in the wages received by risk-averse workers
– depending on the nature of labor contracting, and in particular, on whether workers are
hired at ﬁxed wages in advance of the realization of external demand shocks or are instead
hired (and ﬁred) at wages that depend on these realizations. The equilibrium structure
of ﬁrms and of employment contracts simultaneously determine the ultimate distribution
of income risks among ﬁrms and workers within the region.
Note that Krugman (1991) studies the impact of labor market pooling eﬀects on work-
ers’ and ﬁrms’ incentives to co-agglomerate. In contrast, we do not study the location
decisions of workers and ﬁrms. In the present analysis, labor market pooling arises to the
extent that workers and ﬁrms endogenously pool their idiosyncratic risks in a common
localized labor market. We also study the impact of worker risk aversion and the ability
of ﬁrms to insure workers against risks. Thus, treating locational decisions as exogenous
allows us to investigate in more detail the important relationships between business un-
certainty, fragmentation and labor contracting. As will be seen, labor contracting can
mitigate the transmission of risk through the local labor market, and thus reduce the
importance of labor market pooling. Our study may thus be considered as a preliminary
step before investigating the possibility of co-agglomeration of workers and ﬁrms in models
with richer and more speciﬁcations of the labor market than that in Krugman (1991).
The main arguments in the paper can readily be understood by focusing on small
business risks. In this case, Chamberlinian input sharing eﬀects drive the choice of the
production structure. Under Chamberlinian input sharing, each ﬁrm’s beneﬁt from out-
sourcing depends on the outsourcing choice of other manufacturers. Hence, manufacturers
can beneﬁt from outsourcing if the location includes many ﬁrms and if other manufac-
3turers make the same choice. We thus make a ﬁrst point by showing that a coordination
problem arises and that there can exit multiple equilibria where all manufacturers either
integrate or outsource. The manufacturers’ production structure in the location can be-
come history dependent and can be locked in a “wrong” conﬁguration. Furthermore, we
show that the presence of stronger business risk weakens the beneﬁts from outsourcing
and makes it less likely. This is because manufacturers lose some ﬂexibility to adapt their
production process to their idiosyncratic demand conditions under outsourcing.
Our second point is to show that the choice of wage contract strongly depends on the
prevailing production structure. Integrated manufacturers are shown to be less likely to
oﬀer insurance than the many small component producers under perfect ﬁnancial mar-
kets. This is because the small component producers compete more intensively to hire
workers (in a monopolistic competition setting) and are therefore more eager to oﬀer in-
surance to workers. We also show that increases in the amplitude and the correlation of
business risks have important impacts on integrated manufacturers’ decision to oﬀer labor
contracts but that they have a much smaller eﬀect on the component producers’ decision.
Component producers indeed compete more harshly for workers but they also face more
stable demands, the latter being the aggregate of each manufacturer’s idiosyncratic de-
mand. Hence, when economic parameters and coordination run in favor of outsourcing,
ﬁrms oﬀer ﬁxed employment contracts and have ﬁxed sizes; ﬁrms then beneﬁt from no
risk pooling in the localized labor market. To sum up, our analysis stresses the idea that
the importance of labor market pooling eﬀects depends on ﬁrms’ production structures,
which depend on the importance of Chamberlinian input sharing and business risk.
Our analysis begins, in Section 2, with the speciﬁcation of a basic model of regional
production and employment reﬂecting indivisibilities at the level of export ﬁrms and in-
creasing returns in the production of intermediate components as well. Section 3 analyzes
this model under the assumption that employers cannot in any way contract with workers
in advance of the realization of demand shocks and shows that equilibria can emerge with
4fully integrated manufacturing ﬁrms, manufacturing ﬁrms that outsource all production
of components, or a mix of the two, depending on the number of manufacturing ﬁrms
in the region. The extent of wage income risk faced by workers in equilibrium also de-
pends on the number of manufacturing ﬁrms and on the degree of “diversiﬁcation” of
the region’s industrial structure. Section 4 allows for the possibility that ﬁrms may be
able to absorb some of the income risk otherwise borne by workers by contracting with
them ex ante. Such contracts impose costs on ﬁrms, in part by limiting their ability to
adapt employment to realized demand. Whether such contracts are found in equilibrium
depends on trade-oﬀs between these costs and their beneﬁts to risk-averse workers: a
range of equilibrium conﬁgurations is possible. Section 5 concludes.
Related literature: This paper extends the theoretical literature on the forces un-
derlying labor market pooling eﬀects. First, a number of contributions highlight the
importance of labor markets “thickness” in terms of skills, qualiﬁcation or training (see
Helsley and Strange, 1990; Brueckner et al. 2002; or Hamilton and Thisse 2000). Picard
and Toulemonde (2004) show that education plays a role in the labor market thickness
as higher (professional) skills increases the chance of good job matches between ﬁrms and
workers in larger regions. Second, some authors explore ’opportunism’ issues when ﬁrms
are able to exploit workers in locations with job opportunities (Combes and Duranton,
2007; Helsley and Strange, 2007). By contrast, Krugman (1991) focuses on the role of
uncertainty in labor market pooling. As in our model, ﬁrms are uncertain about their
costs and reduce wage variability and the risk premium paid to workers when they are
located close to one another. However, in contrast to Krugman (1991), we do not study
the location decisions but study the eﬀect of risk aversion and labor contracts. Our paper
follows the same line as Wildasin (1995) who examines the theoretical implications of
integrated or pooled labor markets for the distribution of income risk and for the beneﬁts
and costs of tax/transfer policies that protect against such risks. All those contributions
ignore the possibility, explored in Section 4 below, that ﬁrms may explicitly or implicitly
5insure workers against earnings risk (Baily, 1974; Azariadis, 1975; Rosen, 1985).
Our analysis also extends the large literature on the fragmentation of ﬁrms in regional
and urban contexts. We put ourselves in the tradition of Stigler (1951), Vernon (1959),
and Chinitz (1961) by investigating the link between local industrial organization and
agglomeration economies. In contrast to more recent authors such as Egger and Egger
(2007), we do not analyze the impact of distance on ﬁrms’ production structure, nor do
we discuss speciﬁc urban features such as land use and congestion. We also extend the
literature strand initiated by Grossman and Helpman (2002) who study the industry equi-
libria when ﬁrms decide to integrate or to outsource under incomplete contracting and
search cost. In this literature strand, Thesmar and Thoenig (2007) discuss the impact
of outsourcing decision on wage ﬂuctuations. The key diﬀerence between this literature
and our paper lies in our focus on (Chamberlinian) input sharing. We indeed study the
fragmentation of manufacturers that use a common set of inputs, whereas the above liter-
ature investigates the fragmentation of manufacturers that each use a set of components
that is speciﬁc to each manufacturer. Our study therefore ﬁts better the idea of industrial
clusters that share similar inputs as discussed (including with reference to uncertainty) in
Vernon (1959). Our analysis ﬁnally extends previous research on diversity and specializa-
tion. Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1993) analyze specialized cities (with a single industry)
versus diversiﬁed cities (with two industries). Duranton and Puga (2001) discuss the mi-
gration process of ﬁrms from diversiﬁed regions to specialized factory towns. Many recent
studies of economic geography postulate the existence of regions where ﬁnal good pro-
ducers outsource production of intermediate goods to small, diversiﬁed, monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms (see for instance Venables 1996) but take city structure as exogenous in
the sense that downstream ﬁrms never integrate vertically to incorporate upstream pro-
duction. As shown in Section 3, vertically integrated industries may but need not always
arise when industry structure is determined endogenously.
62 The model
Production structure. We model a region with a predetermined number M of ﬁrms, each
of which is the sole producer of a commodity that is sold on external markets.1 These ﬁrms
form the “economic base” of the region (Tiebout, 1962). Each ﬁrm j, j = 1,...M, faces
a demand for its product given by Yj = θjP
−ε
j , where Pj is the price of the commodity,
ε > 1 is the price elasticity of demand, and θj ∈ [θ,θ], 0 < θ < θ < ∞, is a ﬁrm-
speciﬁc random variable that reﬂects demand shocks on external markets. Variations in
θj may result from ﬂuctuations in incomes, preferences, technologies, and prices of related
goods in the rest of the world. With little loss of generality, we assume that E(θj) =
1 ∀j, and thus the variance and covariance of these shocks are var[θj] = E (θj − 1)
2
and cov[θj,θk]j =k = E (θj − 1)(θk − 1). In some instances, we assume that these random
shocks are i.i.d., but we also allow for them to be correlated, including the possibility
that they are perfectly correlated. A low degree of correlation of these shocks can be
interpreted as a situation where the region’s economic base is highly “diversiﬁed”, and,
as we shall see, this sometimes allows for important pooling of risks; this is not possible
when the demand shocks are perfectly correlated. We let θ ≡ (θ1,...,θM) denote the
vector of random shocks.
Each of the M ﬁrms uses various components in the production process; for ease of
reference, we henceforth refer to each of these ﬁrms as a “manufacturing” ﬁrm. As in
Ethier (1982), we can think of the production activities of these ﬁrms as an “assembly”
process in which components are combined to yield a ﬁnal product, according to a CES
production function Yj = [
R Nj
0 xj(i)ρdi]1/ρ, where xj(i) is the quantity of component i in
the ﬁnal product j; here, ρ < 1 and the elasticity of substitution between components
is 1/(1 − ρ).2 Under such a CES production function, each manufacturer beneﬁts from
1Our model could trivially be extended to incorporate an additional perfectly competitive sector that
has a deterministic technology and that uses labor to produce a num´ eraire commodity, as well as other
commodities exported at ﬁxed external prices.
2At the cost of notational complexity, it would be possible to incorporate other inputs in the production
7economies of scope (”love for variety”) that diminish with higher component substitutabil-
ity. Nj represents the total range of components used by ﬁrm j. The production of each
component requires lj(i) = a + bxj(i) units of labor, where a > 0 and b > 0 are pa-
rameters that represent ﬁxed and variable input requirements, respectively; components
are thus produced under conditions of increasing returns to scale. Letting wj denote the
wage rate paid by ﬁrm j, the production of components thus costs cj(i) = (a + bxj(i))wj.
Throughout, we assume that
δ ≡ ρ − 1 + 1/ε > 0,
or, stated diﬀerently, the elasticity of substitution in production exceeds the elasticity of
demand for exported goods, ε. This inequality guarantees that the economies of scope are
small enough to lead manufacturers to choose ﬁnite production levels. Since the elasticity
of demand has already been assumed to be greater than one, this means that ρ > 0 and,
hence, components are substitutes. Note that δ < ρ and δ < ρ/ε < 1/ε.
While the manufacturing ﬁrms are the locus of “assembly” activities, they can produce
components internally, in which case we refer to them as “integrated” manufacturers, or
they may obtain components from specialized local component producers, in which case
we refer to them as “outsourcing” manufacturers. The local component producers utilize
the same increasing-returns production technologies as are available to the manufactur-
ing ﬁrms. Accordingly, the model incorporates no a priori “technological bias” against
or in favor of the local component producers. Any advantage that they may enjoy lies
in the possibly larger equilibrium scale of component production and larger equilibrium
diversity in the types of components produced. When component production is out-
sourced, we obtain an industrial structure characterized by monopolistic competition in
the components sector of the region’s economy. One goal of the analysis is to determine
endogenously which of these two structures emerges in equilibrium. For the sake of analyt-
ical tractability, we assume that outsourcing manufacturers outsource the full production
process, but this would not aﬀect the results of the analysis in any important way.
8of components.
Workers. There is a ﬁxed stock L of identical workers in the region, each supplying
a single unit of labor. Each worker’s utility is a concave function of the wage w. For
some of the analysis, we assume a constant-elasticity utility function u(w) = wα/α with
α ≤ 1, in which case the (constant) coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is 1 − α. (Note
that wα/α reduces to ln(w) when α = 0.) Wages are the only source of income of workers
who are assumed, realistically, to be unable to reduce or eliminate wage risk by holding a
diversiﬁed portfolio of human and nonhuman assets (see Baxter and Jermann, 1997). Risk
aversion implies, of course, that workers prefer employment contracts with ﬁxed rather
than variable wages.
Labor Markets. We assume that whereas ﬁrms have market power in the product and
component markets, ﬁrms and workers are price and (expected) utility takers in the labor
market. This price-taking condition naturally holds when the number of ﬁrms is large.
When the number of ﬁrms is small, we keep this assumption for the sake of consistency
and tractability.
We allow for two possible types of employment relationships. In the ﬁrst, ﬁrms hire
workers ex post (i.e., subsequent to the realization of demand shocks) in single competitive
market at a wage rate of w. In the second, ﬁrms may contract with workers ex ante to sup-
ply their labor at a ﬁxed (non-state-contingent) wage w′. This ﬁrst of these assumptions,
which is commonplace in the literature of urban and regional economics, prohibits ﬁrms
from contracting with risk-averse workers in ways that protect the latter from income
risk. Its virtue, in the present context, is that it allows us to focus, in Section 3, on the
implications of risk for the organization of the production process, independently of risk-
sharing complications. The second assumption, utilized in Section 4, brings risk aversion
and risk sharing back into the analysis. Of course, the literature of contract theory oﬀers
many alternative models of labor contracting, and future research in urban economics
may well explore alternative speciﬁcations. Here, for the sake of analytical tractability,
9we will simply assume that contracts are exclusive and non-renegotiable: on the one hand,
ﬁrms are not allowed to hire additional workers ex post, to ﬁre contracted workers, or to
reduce the contracted wage payment; on the other hand, contracted workers are obliged
to oﬀer their labor, cannot quit the ﬁrm or renegotiate higher wages. In contrast to Sch¨ ob
and Wildasin (2007), wage contracts not only impose constraints on labor price but also
on the size of a contracting ﬁrm. Also, in contrast to Duranton and Combes (2006), a
ﬁrm is not allowed to ‘poach’ workers from other ﬁrms by oﬀering higher ex post wages.3
In Section 3, we restrict attention to the case where hiring only occurs ex post; later, we
allow for ex ante contracting and for the endogenous determination of contracting form.
Access to Financial Markets. The issue of long-term labor contracting and risk sharing
between workers and ﬁrms is closely linked to the existence and extent of ﬁnancial markets
through which risks can be diversiﬁed. The usual justiﬁcation for long-term contracting is
that ﬁrms can bear risks at lower costs than workers because owners of ﬁrms, as recipients
of nonwage income, can pool risks through portfolio diversiﬁcation.
Financial markets permitting such diversiﬁcation may be assumed to operate perfectly
and costlessly, and we do examine labor market contracting under this assumption. How-
ever, whether all ﬁrms have access to ﬁnancial markets on equal terms is debatable. In
particular, smallness is a main feature of monopolistic competition, in which component
makers are assumed to engage, and access to capital markets may well be more limited for
small, monopolistically competitive ﬁrms as compared with large manufacturing ﬁrms. In
many regions, the intermediate sector often includes small family-run ﬁrms funded with
limited and unsophisticated capital structures, perhaps built mainly around family assets.
Also, it is more costly for investors to monitor smaller ﬁrms; the lack of collateral in small
businesses usually restricts credit (Audretsch and Elston, 2002). A complete model of
endogenous ﬁnancial structure for monopolistically competitive ﬁrms goes well beyond
3Beneﬁts from larger component variety in cities are not considered in Sch¨ ob and Wildasin (2007) and
Combes and Duranton (2006).
10the scope of the present analysis, but it seems natural at least to consider that small ﬁrms
may pay a premium, relative to large ﬁrms, for access to ﬁnancial markets.
To capture the diﬀerential costs that small ﬁrms incur in oﬀering ex ante wage con-
tracts, we assume, in Section 4, that each component producer pays a premium as an
additional ﬁxed cost (τ − 1)aw > 0 (τ ≥ 1) that is proportional to the production ﬁxed
cost a and to the realization of the wage. The total ﬁxed cost then becomes τaw. The
parameter τ could represent the transactions costs absorbed by small ﬁrms when dealing
in ﬁnancial markets, including the extra staﬃng and other costs that a ﬁrm must incur
when meeting auditing and control requirements for outside ﬁnancial counterparts. The
special case where τ = 1 thus corresponds to the assumption that small ﬁrms face perfect
capital markets.
3 Risk and Industrial Structure
In order to focus exclusively on production-side considerations that inﬂuence industrial
structure in a risky environment, the present section postulates that ﬁrms and workers
are prohibited from entering into ex ante labor contracts; equivalently, one could assume
that workers are risk-neutral, so that such contracts would serve no useful purpose and
would not appear in equilibrium.
To understand the incentives to outsource in this setting, we compare the proﬁts of
manufacturing ﬁrms under integration and under outsourcing.
3.1 Integrated Manufacturers
Let M and M denote, respectively, the set and the number of manufacturing ﬁrms and
let MI and MI denote the set and the number of integrated manufacturing ﬁrms. Each
ﬁrm j ∈ MI chooses the number of components, hires workers in a perfectly competitive
labor market, sets its product price and, ﬁnally, supplies its product market.
11By symmetry, ﬁrm j produces identical quantities of components: xj(i) ≡ xj for all
i. The production function then simpliﬁes to Yj = xjN
1/ρ
j and the ﬁrm’s production cost
is (aNj + bYjN
ρ−1
ρ
j )w, a convex function of Nj. For any desired level of output Yj, the
cost-minimizing numbers of each components and of component varieties are given by





and Nj = (Yj/x)
ρ. (1)
Note that changes in output aﬀect only the number of varieties of components, not the
amount of each that is used. The optimal labor requirement and the indirect cost function
are
lj (Yj) = cY
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Cost is a sub-additive function of output. Economies of scope are internalized in the
integrated ﬁrm so that average costs decrease with output and are larger than marginal
cost. Furthermore, both marginal and average costs decrease with output at the (negative)
rate ρ−1 while inverse demand and marginal revenue functions decrease at the (negative)
rate −1/ε. Under the assumption δ ≡ ρ − 1 + 1/ε > 0, interior solutions exist and yield
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δ > 1. When wages rise, the equilibrium output Yj decreases. When the ﬁrm faces
a positive demand shock (i.e., a high value of θj), it increases its output and decreases its
product price. Since increases in output reduce the average ﬁxed costs of components, a
ﬁrm facing a high level of demand or low wages chooses a large number of components.
12In turn, a larger variety of components decreases marginal cost and price. Finally, proﬁt
decreases with wages.

























is a measure of the impact of integrated ﬁrms’ shocks on their total demand for labor. This
is an increasing and jointly convex function of θ because δε < ρ. ceteris paribus, integrated
ﬁrms hire more workers when market wages w raise, when such ﬁrms are numerous (larger
MI), and when they are hit by a common shock that increases ΨI.
We now turn to the analysis of the manufacturing ﬁrms that choose to outsource
production to the local component producers.
3.2 Outsourcing Firms
Let Mo and Mo denote, respectively, the set and number of outsourcing manufacturers.
These ﬁrms outsource their production of all components to a set of Chamberlinian ﬁrms,
each producing a single component variety. Outsourcing manufacturers are then just
assembly line ﬁrms that use components produced by others in the region.
The component sector is subject to Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. Each
component maker i ∈ [0,N] produces a single component and sets a proﬁt-maximizing
price p(i), conditional on the realization of all demand shocks for outsourcing manufac-
turers. Under Chamberlinian monopolistic competition, manufacturers are price takers
in the component market. With free entry, component producers’ proﬁts fall to zero and
the number of component producers reaches its equilibrium value N.
The demand for a component is given by the sum of the outsourcing manufacturers’
demands. Each outsourcing ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt YjPj −
R N
0 p(i)xj(i)di. Proﬁts are
13concave under the assumption that δ > 0. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to xj(i)


















is the component price index in the region. The manufacturer’s cost
R N
0 p(i)xj(i)di is then
equal to pYj. So, the outsourcing manufacturer’s cost is proportional to the component
price index p.
Manufacturing ﬁrms’ proﬁts can be written as functions of product prices and the
component price index as Πj = (Pj − p)Yj. Replacing the product demand Yj by θjP
−ε
j ,
the production and proﬁt of each outsourcing manufacturing ﬁrm is computed as
Yj = θjξp




where ξ ≡ (ε − 1)εε−ε. Note that because the proﬁt decreases with the price index p, it
increases with a larger variety of local components used in the production process. The
outsourcing manufacturer therefore has incentives to purchase all component varieties
available in the local market.



























is a measure of the average demand shock realized by the outsourcing manufacturers.
The supply of components is derived as follows. Each component producer i manufac-
tures a single variety of component and hires workers in the labor market, where it is price
14taker. It thus maximizes p(i)x(i) − (a + bx(i))w, treating the wage and the price index
p as constants. Because of iso-elastic demand, the optimal price is a constant markup
over marginal cost equal to p(i) = bw/ρ. Furthermore, free entry requires that proﬁts of
component producers are equal to zero. This implies that x(i) = (a/b)(ρ/(1 − ρ)) = x.
Note that the optimal level of component production turns out to be equal to that chosen
by integrated ﬁrms.4










that is, the equilibrium price index of components and therefore the manufacturer’s cost
are directly related to ex post wages and inversely related to the number of outsourcing
manufacturers Mo.














The total labor demand by the outsourcing sector is therefore equal to No times the labor
demand of each component producer (a + bx). Hence this labor demand falls with higher
wages (w) and rises with larger numbers of local component producers (Mo) and with
positive common shocks on the outsourcing manufacturers (higher Ψo).

































We can make two observations about the outsourcing manufacturers’ proﬁts. First, each
outsourcing manufacturer beneﬁts from the outsourcing decision of other manufacturers.
4This is a standard result of CES functions; Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) show, for CES preferences, that
equilibrium production is equal to the ﬁrst best production.
15This is because the set of local component producers increases when more manufactur-
ers choose to outsource. Manufacturers then beneﬁt from Chamberlinian externalities
through a wider diversity of components. Such a beneﬁt results from the manufacturers’
technological preference for input diversity and the deeper specialization of component
producers as the same ﬁxed input of each component is shared amongst more than one
manufacturer (see Ethier, 1982; Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Puga and Duranton, 2004).
Second, it is interesting to observe the impact of shocks on manufacturers’ proﬁts under
integration and outsourcing. In general, the proﬁts under integration and outsourcing are
nonlinear functions of each ﬁrm’s shock θj because the latter impacts nonlinearly on both
wages w and average demand shock Ψo. However, a simple case can be discussed when
the region includes many ﬁrms with independent shocks and where the set of outsourcing
manufacturers is large enough. In that case, w and Ψo can be considered as constant.
The proﬁt of an outsourcing manufacturer j is then linear in its own shock θj whereas it
is an increasing and convex function of its own shock under integration.5 Hence, expected
proﬁts do not depend on shock variances under outsourcing whereas they rise with mean-
preserving increases of variance under integration. Manufacturers are thus more likely to
prefer integration when they face large uncertainties. This is because integration oﬀers
better production ﬂexibility: it allows the integrated manufacturer to adapt the spectrum
of components contingent on the realization of a production shock whereas an individual
manufacturer has no inﬂuence on the range of available components under outsourcing
(as No is ﬁxed in expression (8)).
3.3 Equilibrium Wage Determination
Equilibrium wages are determined conditional on the realization of demand shocks so
as to clear the labor market. A region may include both integrated and outsourcing
5The impact of convexity on the expected proﬁt of integrated ﬁrms is also highlighted in Duranton
and Puga (2004), Section 2.4.
16manufacturing ﬁrms, and these ﬁrms compete for labor with component producers. All
ﬁrms are price takers in the labor market. Labor market clearing requires that
L = LI (w,MI,ΨI) + No(w,Mo,Ψo)(a + bx)






















Thus, the equilibrium wage rises as the number of integrated and outsourcing manufac-
turers increases and ﬂuctuates according to the aggregate shocks (ΨI and Ψo) of each
type of manufacturer.
3.4 The Deterministic Case
It is instructive to consider ﬁrst the special case of the model where all demand uncertainty
disappears (θj = 1 ∀j). What determines whether manufacturers choose to be integrated
or to outsource?
We say that the set of manufacturing ﬁrms are in an equilibrium conﬁguration when
no ﬁrm can proﬁtably switch its own organization of production, given the organiza-
tional conﬁguration of all other manufacturers. Because of the assumption that ﬁrms act
competitively in the labor market, none believe that their choices of integration versus
outsourcing have an impact on wages. For any given wage w, the ratio of proﬁts under























It is apparent that c M is a critical value that determines manufacturers’ incentives to
outsource production.6 Low values of c M favor outsourcing decisions while high values
6Comparative statics on c M is are diﬃcult to obtain analytically. It can nevertheless be numerically
shown that c M > 1 for all admissible values of ρ ∈ (0,1) and ε > 1 such that δ > 0 and that c M is a
decreasing function of ε and ρ.
17favor integration. The nature of equilibrium however depends on the value of c M and on
how the latter compares to the number Mo of ﬁrms that outsource. When c M > M, the
proﬁts of any one individual manufacturer are increased if it integrates its operations, no
matter how other manufacturing ﬁrms are organized. It follows that all manufacturing
ﬁrms make the same integration decision, and that all ﬁrms therefore are integrated in
equilibrium because Πo
j/ΠI
j < 1 for any Mo ≤ M. For c M < M, the above argument is
valid only if there initially is a small number of outsourcing manufacturers in the market
(Mo < c M). Otherwise, ﬁrms have incentives to outsource, and those incentives increase
as more ﬁrms decide to outsource. The incentives to integrate or outsource are illustrated
in Figure 1, where heavy dots indicate equilibrium conﬁgurations, showing that there can
be multiple equilibria (McLaren, 2000).
Insert Figure 1 here
To summarize,
Proposition 1 Consider a region of M manufacturing ﬁrms with identical deterministic
demands. There always exists an equilibrium.
(i) If c M > M, then all ﬁrms choose to integrate.
(ii) If c M ≤ M, then there are two equilibrium conﬁgurations: either all manufacturers
will be integrated, or all will outsource.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 allows us to make the ﬁrst point of our analysis. Under Chamberlinian
input sharing, a coordination problem arises and there can exit multiple equilibria where
all manufacturers either integrate or outsource. The manufacturers’ production structure
in the location can become history dependent and it can be locked in a “wrong” conﬁg-
uration. This result is also consistent with situations in which similar industries appear
18to arrive at diﬀerent equilibrium conﬁgurations. For instance, high-tech ﬁrms located
along Route 128 in Boston appear to be more highly integrated than their Silicon Valley
counterparts, where outsourcing seems to be more prevalent (Saxenian, 1994).
3.5 The Stochastic Case
Let us now reintroduce demand uncertainty into the model. We shall assume that ﬁrms
must choose their organizational form prior to the realization of demand shocks. In this
uncertain environment, the ex post wage is also stochastic, as shown in equation (10).
We assume throughout that manufacturing ﬁrms are risk neutral, that is, they seek to
maximize expected proﬁts. The assumption of risk neutrality for these ﬁrms rests on a
presumption that they have access to ﬁnancial markets (e.g., equities markets) or are part
of larger diversiﬁed corporations external to the region, such that their proﬁt risks are
eﬀectively shared at no cost.
We say that the set of manufacturing ﬁrms are in an equilibrium conﬁguration when
no ﬁrm can increase its expected proﬁts by switching its own organization of production,
given the organizational conﬁguration of all other manufacturers. As before, none believe
that their choices of integration versus outsourcing have any impact on wages. The ratio




































As in the deterministic case, the incentive for a ﬁrm j to choose integration or outsourcing
depends on the number of outsourcing ﬁrms Mo, but now it also depends on the nature of
its own demand shocks and the correlation of those shocks with the ex post wage. Again,
the incentive to outsource is high when suﬃciently many other ﬁrms do so (Mo large).
The impact of shocks is embedded in the function Gj(Mo,MI), which depends on
the sets of ﬁrms that outsource and integrate component production. In its general form,
19this function depends on the way manufacturers are partitioned between outsourcing and
integrated structures. When there are no shocks, θj = 1 ∀j, this function is equal to
1, and Proposition 1 applies. It also applies when shocks are symmetric and perfectly
correlated, since then Ψo = θj and Gj = 1 ∀j. In economic terms, a common shock
simultaneously raises the labor demands and the proﬁts of all ﬁrms in same proportion,
so that the incentives to outsource are unchanged. Thus:
Proposition 2 When manufacturing ﬁrms face perfectly correlated shocks, equilibrium
conﬁgurations exist and are as characterized in Proposition 1.
Somewhat more generally, we may consider ex ante symmetric ﬁrms whose demand
shocks are identically distributed but are not necessarily perfectly correlated, so that the
identity of the ﬁrms that outsource or integrate is thus irrelevant. Then the function
Gj(Mo,MI) becomes a function G(Mo) that depends only on the number Mo of out-







G(Mo) increases in Mo, the argument of
Proposition 1 applies, but with a new threshold c M1. How this threshold compares with
c M is a diﬃcult question. A partial but informative answer can be obtained in the case
of small identical risks. Suppose that shocks are distributed with small identical variance
σ2 ≡ var(θj) and identical correlation r ≡ cov(θj,θk)/σ2 for all j  = k ∈ M. Then, we
show in the Appendix that G(Mo) = 1 − σ2 (1 − r)Γ(Mo) < 1 where Γ(Mo) is a pos-
itive function of Mo. Because σ2 is small, the threshold c M1 is unique and larger than
c M. It increases with larger shock variance and decreases with higher shock correlation.
Consistently with Proposition 2, c M1 is equal to c M when shocks are perfectly correlated
r = 1.
Proposition 3 When manufacturing ﬁrms face small, identically distributed shocks, equi-
librium conﬁgurations exist and are characterized as in Proposition 1, except that c M must
be replaced by c M1 (c M1 > c M).
Proof. See Appendix.
20To sum up the discussion so far, we begin in Proposition 1 by noting that multiple
equilibria may occur where all ﬁrms either integrate or outsource. Propositions 2 and 3
extend this result to the case of uncertainty. Intuitively, business uncertainties reduce
the manufacturer’s beneﬁts from outsourcing compared to integration. Indeed, the ra-
tio EΠo
j/EΠI
j falls as manufacturers face larger uncorrelated shocks. This reﬂects the
above-mentioned advantage of production ﬂexibility in integrated ﬁrms. When business
uncertainties are higher, manufacturers prefer to keep control over the number and the
use of each component. This advantage is even more pronounced when ﬁrms face less
than perfectly-correlated shocks. As a result, larger business uncertainty increases the
likelihood of a locale with integrated manufacturers.
In contrast to Proposition 1, when uncertainty is suﬃciently large, the integrated
structure can dominate for any number of outsourcing manufacturers in the locale, i.e.,
EΠo
j/EΠI
j < 1 for all Mo and integration of all manufacturers is therefore the equilibrium
conﬁguration. Figure 2 gives an example of manufacturers hit by two shock levels θj =
{1 − ∆,1 + ∆} ∀j that are independent and identically distributed. The lower curves
correspond to higher shock amplitudes ∆ (∆ = 0, 0.5, 0.9, 0.99}. When the latter is large
enough, we get that EΠo
j/EΠI
j < 1 for all Mo so that integration is the only equilibrium,
whereas this is not the case for smaller shocks.
Insert Figure 2 here
When ﬁrms’ risks are not identically distributed, Chamberlinian externalities dominate
for small and large numbers of ﬁrms as in the preceding paragraphs. As before, there may
exist multiple equilibrium conﬁgurations for intermediate numbers of ﬁrms. Still, there are
two important diﬀerences with the previous analysis. First, because ﬁrms are not ex ante
symmetric, they may take diﬀerent decisions with respect to their structures. For instance,
ﬁrms facing high demand uncertainty may always prefer to integrate production because
21this conﬁguration oﬀers better production ﬂexibility. An equilibrium conﬁguration may
then include a mix of integrated and outsourcing ﬁrms. Second, in the absence of ex
ante symmetry, ﬁrms get diﬀerent ex ante proﬁts and may not agree on an equilibrium
conﬁguration.
To conclude this section, note that the equilibrium wage is, in general, dependent on
the realizations of the demand for the manufacturing ﬁrms in the region, which means that
workers face wage risk. This is true, of course, when workers are employed by integrated
manufacturing ﬁrms, since these ﬁrms face stochastic demand for their products. It is also
true when workers are employed by component-producing ﬁrms because demand shocks
in external markets are transmitted through the manufacturing ﬁrms to the upstream
component producers.
Under either type of industrial structure, the magnitude of wage risk depends on the
number of manufacturing ﬁrms in the region M and on the joint distribution of their
demand shocks. In particular, if M is large and the demand shocks are uncorrelated (the
case where the θj’s are i.i.d.), the variance of the equilibrium wage will be small: the
high demand for labor by ﬁrms with high levels of output demand will oﬀset the low
demand for labor with low demand realizations, so that the total demand for labor is
relatively stable. This corresponds to a “diversiﬁed” industrial structure for the region.
If M is relatively small, however, or if external demand shocks are highly correlated, then
demand for labor will vary signiﬁcantly across states of nature, as will the equilibrium
wage; in this case, wage risk will be high. Correlated risks may arise when the region’s
economic base is highly specialized around just a few types of exported commodities
(the automobile industry in Detroit provides one illustration). Since demand on external
markets may depend on aggregate economic conditions (the economy-wide business cycle,
for instance), the case of correlated risks can also arise when there are many diﬀerent types
of ﬁrms in the region’s economic base.
The analysis so far has emphasized the role of uncertainty as a determinant of equilib-
22rium industrial structure. The model is one in which labor is pooled within the urban or
regional economy and can be reallocated in a state-contingent manner through the labor
market. As remarked by Duranton and Puga (2004, Section 2.4), there are “eﬃciency
gains from sharing resources among ﬁrms that do not know ex ante how much of these
resources they will need”. Of course, the pooling of labor means that wage risks are,
to some extent, likely to be mitigated, but they need not be completely eliminated. If
workers are indiﬀerent to risk, then the fact that wages vary stochastically in response
to ﬂuctuations in external demand is, for them, a matter of no consequence. In practice,
however, households are risk averse, and wage risk can be very costly to them. This means
that workers would value employment relationships that provide some form of insurance
against wage ﬂuctuations, a possibility that we have so far precluded by the assumption
that all wage determination and employment decisions are made ex post. We now consider
the possibility that ﬁrms oﬀer labor market contracts prior to the revelation of the state
of nature, which can allow for risks to be shifted and for the cost of risk-bearing to be
reduced.
4 Industrial Structure and Labor Contracts
In order for workers to be protected from wage risk, they must either be able to obtain
insurance that oﬀers state-contingent payments based on wage realizations, or they must
be able to contract for wages before the state of nature is known. Because of well-known
issues relating to transactions costs and moral hazard, we assume that workers are unable
to purchase earnings insurance individually. This means that the only opportunity to
obtain protection against wage risk must come from labor contracts. In the spirit of the
theory of implicit contracts (Baily, 1974; Gordon, 1974; Azariadis, 1975), when ﬁrms are
risk neutral, they can provide insurance to workers by oﬀering labor contracts in which
wages and employment are ﬁxed ex ante. There are of course many alternative models
of labor contracting, but we focus for simplicity on contracts that are exclusive and non-
23renegotiable. Our principal goal is to highlight the way that industrial structure inﬂuences
equilibrium labor market contracts and the distribution of risk between workers and ﬁrms.
The preceding section has emphasized two possible equilibrium conﬁgurations where
all manufacturers either integrate or outsource. For the sake of exposition we will focus
on those two conﬁgurations and examine labor contracting by ﬁrms in each structure,
starting with integrated manufacturers.7 Throughout this section, we continue to assume
that manufacturing ﬁrms have access to ﬁnancial markets or are otherwise suﬃciently
diversiﬁed that they are indiﬀerent to risk.
4.1 Labor Contracting By Integrated Manufacturers
Suppose again that L workers and M manufacturing ﬁrms have settled in a region and
that all ﬁrms have chosen to integrate: MI = M and Mo = 0.8 Consider an integrated
manufacturing ﬁrm j ∈ MI. We ﬁrst determine the properties of its wage contract and
then compare the expected proﬁts of this ﬁrm with and without such contracts. Firms can
potentially hire workers ex post, in which case ﬁrms pay workers the stochastic equilibrium
wage as described previously. Alternatively, they can oﬀer ex ante contracts with a ﬁxed
wage. Firms and workers are assumed to act as price-takers both in the ex ante and ex
post labor markets. This means that no ﬁrm can pay a wage lower than the prevailing
wage in the ex ante market, w′, or in the ex post market, w. Equilibrium is attained when
labor demand is equal to labor supply both ex ante and ex post.
Let M′
I and M′
I denote the set and the number of integrated manufacturers that choose
to hire ex ante, and let L′
I denote the amount of labor that they employ. There are thus
MI −M′
I ﬁrms that hire the remaining L−L′
I workers at a wage rate of w, subsequent to
the realization of demand shocks. There are three possible types of equilibrium: one in
7A more complete discussion of mixes of outsourcing and integrated structures can be found in Picard
and Wildasin (2006).
8From Propositions 1 and 3, this is likely to occur when M is suﬃciently small or if manufacturers
are “locked” into an integrated structure.
24which all manufacturers hire in the ex ante market (M′
I = MI), one in which none hire
in the ex ante market (M′
I = 0), and one in which some hire in both (0 < M′
I < MI). If
u(w′) < Eu(w), L′
I must be zero because all workers prefer ex post employment, whereas
L′
I = L if u(w′) > Eu(w). Thus, to determine which type of equilibrium emerges, we
need only to compare the expected proﬁts of integrated ﬁrms when u(w′) = Eu(w).
Suppose that ﬁrm j oﬀers an ex ante contract with a wage w′ and chooses its pro-





j . The expected levels of output





























where I′ denotes the levels obtained under ex ante contracting by integrated ﬁrms and
where
ρ
δ − 1 > 0. An integrated ﬁrm’s labor demand is lI′
j = cY
I′ρ
j . We now compare the



























j denotes expected proﬁts for an integrated manufacturer who hires labor in
the ex post market.
Assuming constant relative risk aversion, the condition that u(w′) = Eu(w) means






























Observe from this condition that the incentive to hire ex ante depends on the set of ﬁrms
that are active in the ex post labor market MI\M′
I, but it is independent of the size
of the ex post labor market (as measured by L
′
I). An integrated ﬁrm j does not oﬀer
25ex ante contracts iﬀ Fj is below one. Thus, an equilibrium occurs when the integrated
manufacturers can be partitioned in such a way that Fj(MI\M′
I) < 1 for all j ∈ MI\M′
I
and Fj(MI\M′
I) ≥ 1 for all j ∈ M′
I. There need not be a unique equilibrium since several
partitions of integrated ﬁrms may satisfy these equilibrium conditions.
Obviously, at a given conﬁguration (MI\M′
I), a decrease in workers’ risk aversion
(larger α) increases workers’ certainty equivalent of wages (Ewα)/α which reduces Fj and
reduces the proﬁtability of an ex ante contract. When workers are risk-neutral (α = 1),
the ratio Fj is below 1 provided that ﬁrm j’s shocks are not correlated too much with
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δ > 1, are convex functions of z, where the second line presents a simple
algebraic rearrangement in the denominator and where the last line uses the deﬁnition
of covariance for variables with means equal to one. When ﬁrm j’s shocks are negatively
correlated or completely uncorrelated with wages, the covariance in the last line is non-
negative and the ratio is below 1. In this case, ﬁrm j does not oﬀer ex ante contracts:
ex ante contracting constrains the ability of the ﬁrm to adjust output and employment
in response to demand shocks, a cost that is not oﬀset by the willingness of workers to
accept a lower wage ex ante.
Some conﬁgurations are easy to characterize. First, if the number of manufacturing
ﬁrms is large and demand shocks are i.i.d., the ex post wage w is almost constant. We get
Fj < 1 because E(θ
ρ
δε






δ > 1. Hence, integrated ﬁrms do not oﬀer ex ante
26contracts in the presence of many other ﬁrms with uncorrelated demands. On the one
hand, the absence of ex post wage ﬂuctuation makes insurance useless for workers. On
the other hand, labor contracting imposes a ﬂexibility cost to the manufacturer because
the work force cannot be adapted after the realization of the shock. Therefore, the
manufacturer is not inclined to oﬀer such insurance.
Second, if all ﬁrms have perfectly correlated demand shocks, so that θj = θ0 for all
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0 provided that α ∈ (0,1). Thus, integrated ﬁrms with perfectly correlated
demands oﬀer ex ante contracts. The case of a single integrated ﬁrm may be viewed as
a particular instance of the case of perfectly correlated shocks. Hence, we should expect
to see ex ante labor contracting in “factory towns”.9 Note that when workers are risk
neutral (i.e., α = 1) and risks are perfectly correlated, ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between hiring
ex ante or ex post: on the on hand, workers place no value on wage stability, and, on the
other hand, ﬁrms gain nothing from ex post employment ﬂexibility. To summarize:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the manufacturers in the region choose to integrate produc-
tion. Then:
(i) in diversiﬁed regions with many manufacturers, manufacturers do not contract with
workers ex ante;
(ii) if manufacturers have perfectly correlated demand shocks, they do contract with
workers ex ante, providing workers with actuarially fair insurance (w′ = Ew);
(iii) when manufacturers face demand shocks that are partially correlated, equilibria
are possible in which ﬁrms with demand shocks that are highly positively correlated with
ex post wages contract for labor ex ante, while ﬁrms with demand shocks that are highly
9Of course the assumption of price-taking behavior is not really justiﬁable in the case of a sole manu-
facturing ﬁrm, but this result emphasizes the importance of lack of risk diversiﬁcation as the underlying
reason for ex ante labor contracting in this model.
27negatively correlated with ex post wages contract for labor ex post.
More intuition can be obtained if we study the case of small demand uncertainty (i.e.,
variance of θj is small compared to its mean value 1).
Small risks. For small demand uncertainty (see Appendix), we can compute that











where w is the endogenously-determined ex post wage.
This formula conﬁrms the two previous results: ﬁrms do not oﬀer ex ante labor con-
tracts when there are many ﬁrms and wages are almost non-stochastic, whereas they do
oﬀer such contracts when shocks are highly positively correlated. Furthermore, if workers
are suﬃciently risk averse, α is very negative and the inequality is not satisﬁed, which is
to say that ex ante contracting dominates in this case.
This formula also shows how ex ante and ex post employment contracts can co-exist:
a ﬁrm is more likely to hire ex ante if its demand shock has low variance or if it is
positively correlated with the ex post wage. Indeed, if it has low variance, the ﬁrm does
not really need production ﬂexibility and contracting with workers is beneﬁcial. If its
shock is positively correlated with ex post wages, the ﬁrm expects high product demand
when wages are high and low product demand when wages are low; as a consequence, its
production and demand for labor is stable and ex ante contracts imposes little cost while
oﬀering wage stability to workers.
To make things even clearer, we may substitute for the equilibrium wage from (10) into
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28where mI is the mean of shocks of integrated ﬁrms that do not contract ex ante: mI =
P
k∈MI\M′
I θk/(MI − M′
I). A ﬁrst result is that no integrated manufacturer hires ex ante
if α = 1 because 2cov (θj,mI) ≤var(θj)+ var(mI). A second result is that each integrated
ﬁrm wants to hire ex ante for large risk aversion provided that there remains an integrated
ﬁrm that does not contract ex ante (mI > 0).
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the manufacturers in the region choose to integrate produc-
tion and that risks are small. For low values of risk aversion by workers, no ﬁrm hires ex
ante. If workers are highly risk-averse, all ﬁrms but one hire ex ante. For intermediate
values of risk aversion, some ﬁrms may hire ex ante while others hire ex post.
4.2 Labor Contracting Under Outsourcing
Let us now consider the nature of labor contracting when all manufacturing ﬁrms out-
source the provision of components (Mo = M).10 The makers of components are assumed
to be free to enter both before the realization of demand shocks and subsequent to their
realization. In the latter case, entry occurs until ex post proﬁts are zero. In the former
case, entry prior to the realization of the shocks occurs until expected proﬁts are zero.
As before, ﬁrms can hire workers ex post, paying them the stochastic equilibrium
ex post wage, or can hire them ex ante, oﬀering a ﬁxed wage. Competition in both
markets means that all ﬁrms take as given the market-determined wages, w for the ex
post stochastic wage and w′ for the ex ante ﬁxed wage. Equilibrium is attained when
labor demand is equal to labor supply both ex ante and ex post.
Again, there are three possible types of equilibrium: one in which all workers are
hired ex ante, one in which all are hired ex post, and one in which some are hired in
10From Propositions 1 and 3, this is likely to occur when M is suﬃciently large and manufacturers are
locked into an outsourcing equilibrium.
29both periods. Let N′ denote the number of component producers that hire in the ex ante
market; N − N′ is then the number of component ﬁrms hiring workers ex post.
In the ex ante stage, a component producer i chooses its production x′(i) to maximize
its ex ante proﬁt given the contractual wage w′. That is, the component producer maxi-
mizes π′(i) = E [p′(i)x′(i) − w′(τa + bx′(i))] where τ ≥ 1 is the transaction cost (or risk



























Component producers enter in the ex ante stage as long as they make non-negative
proﬁts, which is equivalent to the condition: x′(i) > τx. This condition implies that wage
oﬀers remain low enough for entry to occur. Therefore, component producers enter ex


















The ﬁrst inequality requires that the ex ante wage oﬀers workers a level of utility as
great as the expected utility that they obtain in the ex post market; the second inequality
requires that the ex ante wage is low enough for the component makers to break even.
(The expression after the second inequality is obtained by solving for w′ from (15) under
the break-even condition x′ = τ¯ x.) If the ﬁrst inequality is not satisﬁed, workers are
unwilling to contract ex ante, and if the second inequality is not satisﬁed, then no ﬁrms
wish to enter ex ante; in either case, N′ = 0.
30In this analysis, the ex post labor market includes only component producers.11 If
component producers hire workers ex post, free entry insures that the price index for










Therefore, the proﬁtability condition x′(i) > x is equivalent to w′ ≤ τρ−1Ew and it follows








We analyze the case of perfect and imperfect ﬁnancial markets in the region.
Perfect Financial Markets. When τ = 1, the above condition is always satisﬁed.
When ﬁnancial markets are perfect, free entry implies that the right-hand relationship is
satisﬁed as an equality (i.e., w′ = Ew) while the fact that u(Ew) > Eu(w) implies that
no workers are willing to be hired ex post. At the same time, since w′ = Ew, x′(i) = ¯ x.
We therefore get the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the manufacturers in the region choose to outsource produc-
tion and that ﬁnancial markets are perfect (τ = 1). Then, component producers always
contract with workers ex ante. The ex ante level of output of each component is equal
to its ex post level. Workers receive actuarially fair insurance against shocks (w′ = Ew)
and they have strictly higher utility than if component ﬁrms were not able to oﬀer ex ante
contracts.
When τ = 1, ex ante entry does not have any impact on ex post wages because the
labor resources required by ﬁrms contracting ex ante, a + bx′(i), are exactly equal to the
11See Picard and Wildasin (2006) for the analysis of a labor market where integrated and outsourcing
manufacturers co-exist.
31labor demand of the same ﬁrms if they hired workers ex post, a + bx. As a result, the
expected utility of workers increases only through better insurance.
Proposition 6 signiﬁcantly contrasts with Proposition 4 because component suppliers
always oﬀer ex ante labor contracts provided that they have access to perfect ﬁnancial
markets. In particular, when regions are diversiﬁed with many manufacturers, workers
do not demand much insurance because of the mild ﬂuctuations of their ex post wages.
In this case, components suppliers are indiﬀerent between oﬀering ex ante contracts or
not, whereas integrated manufacturers deﬁnitely ﬁnd it unproﬁtable because they lose the
ﬂexibility to adapt their production to shocks. Component producers have no need for
such production ﬂexibility because the component demand is also very stable in a diver-
siﬁed region. This explains why component producers are more likely to oﬀer insurance
to workers. This analysis thus shows how labor contracts, and the cost of risk bearing,
may vary under diﬀerent industrial structures.
Of course, this result does not take into account the fact that ﬁnancing may be more
diﬃcult in small ﬁrms like component producers. If the transaction cost (or risk premium)
τ is high they may not ﬁnd any ﬁnancial arrangements to support their business and labor
contracting policies. This is the topic of the next short discussion.
Imperfect Financial Markets. When ﬁnancial markets are not perfect, each component
producer i must produce no less than τx to break even. Because production of components
is inversely related to the ex ante wage w′, component producers tend to oﬀer lower wages
as τ rises. However, when ex ante wages are too small, workers are unwilling to contract
ex ante.
For the sake of exposition, and consistently with Section 4.1, we focus on the assump-













32We then get the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Suppose that the manufacturers in the region choose to outsource pro-
duction and that ﬁnancial markets are imperfect (τ > 1). Then all component ﬁrms hire
workers ex ante if τ < τ0 and none of them hire workers ex ante otherwise. When workers
are hired ex ante, they not only avoid wage risk, they obtain higher expected wages.
Proof. See Picard and Wildasin (2006).
Thus, the state of the ﬁnancial market is a crucial determinant of the labor contract
structure oﬀered by small component producers. On the one hand, these ﬁrms are more
likely to oﬀer insurance to their workers because they suﬀer from smaller demand ﬂuc-
tuations and therefore place a lower value on the ﬂexibility provided by ex post labor
contracting. On the other hand, their ability to provide ex ante labor contracts depends
on whether they can readily fund their business and labor obligations in the regional
ﬁnancial market.
5 Conclusion
This paper has explored the interactions between labor market pooling, the structure of
production, labor market contracting. It uses a model in which manufacturing ﬁrms pro-
duce outputs for external markets by assembling components that are locally-produced.
Manufacturers choose either to produce these intermediate components internally or to
purchase them from monopolistically-competitive local ﬁrms. External demands are
stochastic and the local economy therefore is subject to stochastic shocks. Depending
on whether local production is carried out through integrated manufacturing ﬁrms or
through outsourcing to local producers, and depending on the nature of labor market
contracts, these external demand shocks are absorbed by ﬁrms and workers in the local
economy. We have examined several related matters: (a) How is production organized,
in equilibrium, and how does this depend on the joint distribution of external demand
33shocks – their magnitudes and correlation? (b) What are the implications of demand
shocks for the allocation of labor and for the riskiness of wages? (c) When workers are
risk averse, do ﬁrms have incentives to oﬀer labor contracts that provide workers with
employment and wage security? Do these incentives depend on the organization of local
production?
We have examined these questions within an admittedly stylized model, but one that
allows for indivisibilities in production, endogenous industry organizational structure,
risk, and endogenous labor contracting. Within this rich structure, many equilibrium
outcomes are possible. Several important results emerge.
First, an integrated ﬁrm structure emerges in equilibrium in a region with a small
number of manufacturing ﬁrms. With larger numbers of ﬁrms, however, outsourcing
of component production to specialized local producers can occur. Due to underlying
indivisibilities in production technologies, however, whether manufacturing ﬁrms choose to
outsource depends positively on the choices of other manufacturers, giving rise to multiple
equilibria. For a given set of economic parameters, there may be equilibria with where
all manufacturers are integrated, or, alternatively, where all choose to outsource. We do
not explicitly study the progressive development of a region over time, but the analysis
suggests that a region that develops by hosting successive manufacturing ﬁrms may begin
with, and remain locked into, a possibly ineﬃcient integrated industrial structure. When
manufacturing ﬁrms face greater demand shocks, and when these shocks are less strongly
correlated, the incentive to outsource is weakened.
The nature of equilibrium labor contracts depends on the industrial structure in a re-
gion. We assume that integrated manufacturers have access to internal or global ﬁnancial
markets that allow them to insure against both demand risks and wage risks. Integrated
manufacturers may therefore choose to oﬀer insurance to risk-averse workers through ﬁxed
wage contracts. The beneﬁt to workers from such insurance is modest in large regions
with highly diversiﬁed risks, however. It turns out that integrated manufacturers tend
34not to contract ex ante with workers in large regions hosting many manufacturers with
uncorrelated shocks, but they may oﬀer ex ante contracts when shocks are highly corre-
lated. On the other hand, manufacturers facing external demands that are suﬃciently
correlated with the ex post wage elect to hire workers ex ante, whereas manufacturers
with demand shocks that are suﬃciently negatively correlated with ex post wages do not
hire ex ante. Integrated ﬁrms are more likely to oﬀer wage contracts when workers are
more risk averse.
When manufacturing ﬁrms outsource, labor contracts may, but need not, be oﬀered by
small component producers. An employer’s ability to insure workers depends on its access
to ﬁnancial markets, and we assume that small component producers may face higher
ﬁnancial transaction costs than large manufacturing ﬁrms. Competition for risk-averse
workers can lead small component producers to oﬀer wage and employment protections
to workers, but they will not do so if ﬁnancial transactions costs are too high.
More precisely, there is a threshold value of transactions costs, above which component
producers only contract with workers after stochastic shocks are realized and workers
therefore face risky wages. On the other hand, if component producers can access ﬁnancial
markets at suﬃciently low cost, they will oﬀer ﬁxed-wage contracts to workers, irrespective
of the structure of risks in the region. This result is in contrast to the situation in large
diversiﬁed regions with integrated manufacturing ﬁrms, as these ﬁrms ﬁnd it too costly
to oﬀer job security to workers who, at the same time, face only limited wage risk in the
ex post labor market.
In conclusion, let us note that in diﬀerent historical periods and across the world,
regions diﬀer in the numbers and types of goods that are traded with the rest of the
economy, in the size and correlation of external risks that they face, in their patterns of
growth and development, and in the degree to which ﬁnancial markets enable ﬁrms to
relieve workers of risk through ex ante contracting. The foregoing analysis has shown
that such factors can be expected to inﬂuence the equilibrium characteristics of regional
35economies, so that various regions, at various times, may or may not exhibit a highly
integrated structure of production, a high degree of wage risk, or durable labor contracts.
One key simplifying assumption that has been maintained throughout is that the loca-
tional choices of ﬁrms and workers has been taken as exogenous. The analysis shows that
the importance of labor market pooling eﬀects depends on ﬁrms’ production structures,
which in turn depend on the importance of Chamberlinian input sharing and business
risk. In fact, when the equilibrium production structure is characterized by outsourcing,
ﬁrms with good access to ﬁnancial markets oﬀer ﬁxed employment contracts and have
ﬁxed production plans. They then do not beneﬁt from pooling risk in the localized labor
market. The incentives to co-agglomerate in the same region are therefore mitigated,
in contrast to Krugman (1991). In an economy with interregionally-mobile ﬁrms and
workers, it seems clear that the attractiveness of diﬀerent regions, and thus the degree of
agglomeration in the entire economy, is aﬀected by the equilibrium conﬁgurations of each
of the regional economies. The analysis of the equilibrium of a system of regions, each
with possibly diﬀerent (and simultaneously determined) internal equilibria, is a topic that
warrants additional investigation.
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Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let us write proﬁts as function of the number of outsourcing manufacturing
ﬁrms: Πo
j(Mo) and ΠI
j(Mo). In equilibrium, a manufacturer integrates if it gets a higher
proﬁt by doing so (ΠI
j(Mo − 1) ≥ Πo
j(Mo)) whereas it outsources if it gets a lower proﬁt
(Πo
j(Mo + 1) > ΠI
j(Mo)). Given that manufacturers are price takers in the labor market
they consider the wage as ﬁxed. So, by (3) and (9), we can write that Πo
j(Mo) ≤ ΠI
j(Mo−1)
if Mo ≤ c M. This means that, in a region with Mo outsourcing manufacturers, any
outsourcing ﬁrm wants to integrate and operate in the same region with Mo−1 outsourcing
ﬁrms. Conversely, we have that Πo
j(Mo + 1) > ΠI
j(Mo) if Mo + 1 > c M. So, in a region
with Mo outsourcing manufacturers, an integrated ﬁrm wants to outsource and become
the Mo + 1th outsourcing ﬁrm in this region. Then, (i) if M < c M, any outsourcing
manufacturer chooses to integrate because Mo < c M for any Mo = 1,...,M, which implies
that Πo
j(Mo) ≤ ΠI
j(Mo −1). (ii) Consider now the case where M ≥ c M. Then, on the one
hand, for any 1 ≤ Mo ≤ c M, we have that Πo
j(Mo) ≤ ΠI
j(Mo − 1) so that any outsourcing
manufacturer wants to switch to integration. This triggers an unraveling process with
smaller and smaller Mo. The equilibrium is at Mo = 0: all ﬁrms integrate. On the
other hand, for any c M < Mo + 1 ≤ M, we have that Πo
j(Mo + 1) > ΠI
j(Mo) so that
any integrated manufacturer wants to switch to outsourcing. This triggers an unraveling
process with larger and larger Mo. The equilibrium is at Mo = M: all ﬁrms outsource.
Note that the conﬁguration Mo ∈ (c M −1, c M) can unravel in both direction; it is anyway
not an equilibrium.
405.2 Proof of Proposition 3
























when shocks are distributed with small enough identical variance σ2 ≡ var(θj) and iden-

















δ−1) where w0 is the wage w under no risk (θk = 1). We get
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where the second term vanishes because E (θk − 1) = 0 for all k and where E [(θk − 1)(θl − 1)] =
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, which
turns out to be equal to −Γ(Mo). Therefore,
G(Mo) ≃ 1 − σ
2 (1 − r)Γ(Mo) < 1.
41Derivation of expressions (12) and (13)
Under small risk, we use Taylor approximations around θj = 1 and the fact that Eθj =
1. Hence, Eθ
1/ε
j ≃ 1 + 1
εE (θj − 1) −ε−1
2ε2 E (θj − 1)
2 = 1 − ε−1
2ε2 var(θj). Note then that
Fj(MI\M′
I,Mo) can be expressed in terms of w/w0 where w0 is the wage w under
θj = 1 for all j. Note that w0 is a function of MI\M′
I and Mo. Then E (w/w0)
α ≃ 1


















Using, the Taylor approximation (1 + x)
y ≃ 1 + xy, we get
























which is the result in the text.
Suppose now that Mo = 0. So that w/w0 = Ψ
1/ε
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I θk, we get the following simple equivalence:
Fj (MI,0) < 1 ⇐⇒ 2cov(θj,mI) < var(θj) +
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